Antarctic Science as a Component of Chilean Skepticism toward the United States in the 1940s and 1950s

ABSTRACT

This article presents many factors which help to explain Chilean skepticism toward US Antarctic science in the 1940s and 1950s. Throughout this period Washington insisted that its only objectives were peaceful scientific cooperation and the harmonious resolution of the sovereignty dispute between Britain and the Southern Cone nations, Chile and Argentine. Chileans remained concerned that these objectives sought to conceal another: the militarization of the frozen continent. Cartoons from *Revista Topaze*, a mainstream publication, are featured to accentuate Chileans' reticence toward the United States while the text enlists a variety of primary and secondary sources pertaining to the early Cold War period. The objective is to contextualize why Chileans within and outside the government feared that US Antarctic science might not remain peaceful in nature, as well as to highlight the significance of the Chilean Escudero Plan.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years the Chilean government has funded a series of research projects devoted to *Tierra de O'Higgins*, as the Chilean Antarctic is known. These projects have laid the basis for a number of publications which, among other things, highlight the significance of US-Chilean relations in the formation of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.[1] This article adopts a similar format, though it does not revisit the complexities of inter-governmental discussions. Neither does it dwell at length on the Antarctic "question" itself since this has been amply scrutinized by a number of authors. Instead, it presents Chilean skepticism toward US Antarctic science within the contexts of the early Cold War, Pan-Americanism, and US-Chilean relations.

In response to the US internationalization proposal of 1948, which called for the renunciation of sovereignty claims, the Chilean government tabled the Escudero Plan to "shelve" territorial issues while pursuing some form of agreement which would uphold national rights. For many years the United States refrained from officially endorsing the Escudero Plan, hoping that the sovereignty dispute—in which it, as a non-claimant nation, was not directly involved—somehow might be resolved.[2] A decade later there was no sign that such a resolution could be achieved, and never before had some form of agreement been as necessary; twelve nations had dispatched personnel to the frozen terrain and neither of the superpowers indicated willingness to retreat.[3]

The US internationalization proposal of 1958 established the basis for the Antarctic Treaty signed the following year, and its success owed in large part to the incorporation of the Escudero Plan, which left national claims in place but prohibited their enforcement. The United States' eventual utilization of the plan was symptomatic of its elusive friendship with the smaller American republic.[4] The plan was not immediately accepted but reserved for case of necessity. From a Chilean perspective it helped to discourage US militarization of the far south, which might have been encouraged by the renunciation of sovereignty.

Why did many Chileans dread that the US scientific program in the Antarctic might include transforming the region into a nuclear testing ground? The answer relates in part to the US Navy's Operation High Jump (1946/47), the objectives of which were known to include prospecting for uranium, and during which classified military tests were known to be conducted.[5] Later US expeditions were less militarily oriented though scientific experiments obviously held military applications.[6] For these reasons much of the world was skeptical of US Antarctic policy; however, the Chilean form of skepticism was unique, reflecting a number of regional and national factors to be discussed herein.

The featured cartoons reveal stereotypical attitudes toward the United States, briefly summarizing themes to which entire articles and books have been devoted. Those attitudes naturally bore upon Chilean public opinion toward the far south during this period, helping to explain why the Foreign Affairs Ministry considered boycotting the Antarctic Conference.[7] While the Escudero Plan did preserve Chilean sovereignty, the draft treaty into which it was incorporated formalized the involvement of the superpowers, both of which refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of *Tierra de O'Higgins*. The cartoons bring to life, as documents alone cannot, popular attitudes toward which help to explain the assertive nature of Chilean diplomacy toward the Antarctic.[8] Cartoons reflecting equally skeptical attitudes toward the Soviet Union have not been included since the emphasis remains US-centric.

THE EARLY COLD WAR

Shortly after the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union became embroiled in a competition to export their own systems of government and national values. Chile was not a high priority for either one, and its citizens were more concerned with the economic hardship they faced due to a sharp decline in copper prices. This situation contributed to the polarization of the nation's political

spectrum, with some sectors continuing to sympathize with the defeated Axis powers, and others advocating the Soviet model.[9] One of the few points of agreement was that the nation was unlikely to benefit in any way from the superpower's conflict (see Figure 1). While the Department of State did seek to protect the interests of US-owned copper companies, they remained a peripheral consideration in the early Cold War period.

Figure 1: Uncle Sam and Soviet Marshall Josef Stalin arm-wrestling over South America, oblivious to its own wellbeing. *Revista Topaze*, 22 August 1947.

One of most discouraging feelings shared by Chileans was that US assistance obliged them to support Washington's anticommunist policies,[10] which held the potential to annihilate them as well as the rest of the planet if they were to unleash another world war—as they often seemed likely to. Translated versions of *Life* and *Reader's Digest* presented the US defense of the "free world" in a manner which many Chileans found difficult to accept. Though it begged credulity to suggest that the "Yankee imperialism" was as brutal as the Soviet variety imposed over Eastern Europe, neither were Chileans enthusiastic to place themselves in orbit around Uncle Sam (see Figure 2).

Of particular concern was that Chile might be subject to radioactive fallout if US nuclear tests were to be conducted in the Antarctic.[11] The destructive capacity of atomic weapons had been evident since the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Tests the following year in the Marshall Islands had produced ambivalent results. The power of the weapons fell short of expectation, yet reports noted the deleterious effects of radiation. Eight years later this issue regained headlines when a test contaminated a 7,000-square-mile region, leading to the death of two Japanese fishermen and the emergency relocation of hundreds of Pacific islanders.[12]

A number of world-renowned figures called for an end to nuclear testing but to no avail. As one US senator advocated, the United States had determined that it was necessary "to move forward with the atomic bomb in one hand and the cross in the other."[13] While neither Chile nor the Antarctic was likely to be targeted in a nuclear exchange, the communist newspaper *El Siglo* incessantly warned that the United States sought to use the frozen continent as a nuclear testing ground.[14] This speculation, though repeatedly denied by US officials,[15] was fully justified. Moreover, Chile had no influence over the negotiations at which the superpowers debated nuclear issues and occasionally made concessions to each other, if only as a means of self-preservation.

Figure 2: Uncle Sam at the center of a freedom-loving solar system while Yugoslavia is trapped in orbit around the Soviet Union. *Revista Topaze*, 9 May 1947.

Despite ongoing concern about radioactive fallout and the superpowers' willingness to engage in nuclear brinkmanship, the risk of Armageddon decreased with the signature of the Korean armistice and the death of Stalin in March 1953. The later "spirit of Geneva" called for resolving conflicts through negotiations rather than the threat of use of force.[16] The sincerity of this could be disputed,[17] but not the utility. The superpowers' nuclear stockpiles held the capacity to destroy the planet, and the United States incessantly rejected Soviet proposals calling for their elimination. However sincere those proposals might or might not have been, citizens on either side of the Iron Curtain, and in between, were forced to contemplate their own mortality as well as the possibility that world would be inhabitable for their grandchildren.[18]

PAN-AMERICANISM

After the Second World War, the "good neighbor policy" of President Franklin D. Roosevelt was transformed into a formal commitment to oppose non-American intervention in the Western Hemisphere. This process began with a conference in Chapultepec, near Mexico City, months before the hostilities

had officially been concluded. There the American republics signed a document expressing their unanimous support for the Allied cause. Chile and Argentina were the most reluctant to do so since a large segment of their population sympathized with the Axis, yet they maintained hope that the United States would honor its pledge not to interfere in their domestic affairs.[19]

Two years later representatives of the American republics met in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. A former Department of State official wrote that the conference marked the "high tide of enthusiasm" for hemispheric relations, and that the defense treaty in which it resulted was a testament to the general "confidence in the policy and purposes of the United States."[20] The treaty committed the republics to collectively oppose any outside attack directed against them.[21] Unfortunately the conference did not address the increasingly dire economic situation in Latin America. Stephen G. Rabe notes that this failure gravely undermined prospects for an effective hemispheric alliance.[22]

The United States insisted that private investment offered the best means of ameliorating the plight of its neighbors to the south, despite their requests for more direct aid, such as Western Europe was receiving. While the theoretical benefits of cooperating with US entrepreneurs could not be denied, neither could the fact that the entrepreneurs were self-interested and that the hemisphere remained a low priority for Washington. At the Ninth Pan-American Conference (1948), held in Bogotá, Colombia, these issues prompted rioters to attack the building in which delegates were meeting, throw explosives at the US embassy, and lay most of the downtown to ruins.[23]

The conference proceeded days later. While Colombian troops imposed martial law, the delegates adopted a resolution to take stronger measures against communist subversion—upon which they blamed the destruction.[24] Despite concerns that it might be used as a pretext for US intervention, Latin American delegates signed the resolution. To their disappointment they were still denied the scale of financial assistance which they believed appropriate and had undermined their credibility if they were to approach the Soviet bloc.[25] The only hope of maintaining or increasing US assistance, as depicted by one artist, required a degree of subservience (see Figure 3).

Given its inability to reverse communist advances in Asia, the United States took a preventative tack in Latin America. At the Pan American Conference of 1954, held in Caracas, Venezuela, it gained approval for a still more emphatic anti-communist declaration. It had been planning to overthrow the leftist government of Guatemala long beforehand, and now gained a public rationale for doing so.[26] The Central Intelligence Agency supplied the insurgents with weapons, yet the Department of State portrayed the junta as an example of Latin Americans assuming control of their own destiny.[27]

Waning faith in Pan Americanism led to an indefinite suspension of the next conference. The series of consultative meetings which emerged in its place dwelled on economic issues,[28] reflecting the US hope that free trade eventually might raise the hemisphere's standard of living and stem the rising tide of anti-Yankee sentiment. Most Latin American governments sought to accommodate US interests while maintaining the largest possible degree of autonomy. They did not withdraw from the scaled-back Pan American system since it remained a forum in which to challenge the United States' belief in the superiority and exportability of its own institutions.[29]

Figure 3: A Latin American woman subserviently approaching Uncle Sam for economic assistance. *Revista Topaze*, 5 September 1947.

In 1958 the White House sent Vice President Richard M. Nixon on a tour of seven South American nations, having grossly underestimated the intensity of anti-Yankee sentiment.[30] Protestors disrupted most of his appearances, on some occasions appearing to jeopardize his safety. US marines disembarked to positions in the Caribbean and awaited orders to stage a rescue if that were deemed necessary.[31] After returning home, Nixon blamed his reception on communist agents while President Dwight D. Eisenhower referred more obliquely to "economic causes."[32]

Since the end of the Second World War, the United States' obsession with communism had started to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The rise of Fidel Castro, who was not necessarily a communist when he took power, would allow the Soviet Union to penetrate the hemisphere more directly than ever before. Cole Blasier maintains that the short-sightedness of US policies encouraged nations to seek foreign patrons as hostile to the United States as they considered the United States hostile to them.[33] The majority would refrain from that high-risk scenario, instead continuing to both need and despise US capital.[34]

US-CHILEAN RELATIONS

As previously mentioned, Operation High Jump was widely interpreted as evidence that the United States sought

to militarize the Antarctica. *The New York Times* ventured that, despite the government's stated devotion to peaceful scientific cooperation, the future of the continent might be held hostage by policymakers who thought in terms of long-range bombers.[35] Benjamín Subercaseaux, one of Chile's best-known journalists, suggested that High Jump might be transporting atomic weapons.[36] More conventional reports held that it would be searching for the fissionable materials.[37] While none of these scenarios glorified US intentions, none of them conceived of the full truth.

The operation's "aerial prospecting for atomic energy source materials" was to be accompanied by the test of bacteriological and chemical weapons.[38] The latter objective perhaps could have been justified on scientific grounds. Bacteria and chemicals could be tested for the sake of developing prophylactics or antidotes, as uranium could be prospected during routine exploratory flights. Since these objectives had a measure of plausible deniability, and in the end were successfully concealed,[39] the government proceeded to amplify its devotion to peaceful scientific cooperation.

Though neither he nor any other Chilean could verify the US Navy's agenda, President Gabriel González Videla announced plans to increase cooperation with Argentina in the Antarctic.[40] The Southern Cone nations were unlikely to forge an alliance capable of removing the British from their joint sector from 25º to 90º West. Instead González Videla used the risk of such an alliance to discourage a US territorial claim over most or all of the continent. US documents suggest that this approach was effective despite its inconsistencies: the Chilean president was known to have stalwartly opposed the military regime from which his Argentine counterpart had emerged;[41] the Southern Cone nations had a long history of border disputes; and their populations viewed each other in adversarial terms.[42]

In 1948 González Videla sent another strong message to the United States, Britain, and all of the other nations with stated interests in the Antarctic. He became the first head of state to venture into the disputed peninsular region, vowing to take personal possession of it until Chile's historically and geographically based rights were to gain international recognition. The momentous voyage gained international attention. While some US journalists disparaged it as a publicity stunt,[43] Latin Americans praised his anti-colonial declarations.[44] These declarations openly targeted the British while implicitly questioning the United States' refusal to accept that the hemispheric defense treaty signed at the 1947 Rio Conference extended to the South Pole.[45]

Anti-colonial declarations were naturally popular among Latin Americans in the postwar era, given the hardship which beset them. The term anti-colonial had generally been replaced by another, anti-imperialist, which was used interchangeably with anti-Yankee. González Videla nonetheless attempted to use the term anti-colonial in its most technical sense, that is, as directed against the Old World. He hesitated to go further since he sought alignment with the US-led "free world," though a growing number of Chileans viewed it as no better than the Old World.[46]

The delicacy of his position was evident in relation to both the Antarctic and his fluctuating political allegiances. He had been elected in 1946 and appointed a cabinet which included members of the Communist Party—for the first time in the history of the Western Hemisphere. The nation's many challenges included plummeting copper prices, labor unrest, and violent protests. Given indications that domestic communists were following Moscow's orders to foment a revolution, González Videla expelled the communists from his cabinet. Within months he went further, outlawing the Communist Party and breaking diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.[47]

His decision to avoid publicly criticizing Washington's tacit endorsement of the British Antarctic might be construed as the product of his allegiance to the Northern Colossus. That is how his opponents interpreted his attempt to deal fairly with the US-owned copper companies which provided approximately half of the government's revenue.[48] Despite being taxed at rates up to ninety percent, they earned great profits, a fact which most Chileans resented. González Videla was neither immune from resentment,[49] nor easily swayed from his moderation.[50] While many denounced him for being subservient to the United States, his supporters gloated that he had taken an even harder and more effective line against communism (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: González Videla standing over the defeated communist enemy while President Harry S. Truman and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill remain safely outside the boxing ring. *Revista Topaze*, 20 June 1947.

Former military ruler Carlos Ibáñez del Campo won the presidential election in 1952 primarily due to his anti-Yankee rhetoric. His campaign pledges had included nationalizing the copper industry and rescinding the nation's military pact with Washington.[51] In office he left them unfulfilled, seeming to confirm his prior assurance to the US embassy that they had been necessary to win votes but that, in truth, he felt no animosity toward the United States.[52] His genuine intent remained difficult to gauge as some of the individuals he appointed to positions dealing with the United States had fervently supported the National Socialists.[53]

Foreign Minister Arturo Olavarría Bravo, well-known for his anti-British, anti-US attitudes, threatened to go war over the Antarctic region in which Britain destroyed a small Chilean outpost in early 1953. It has been suggested that his dismissal thereafter indicated that he had spoken without the president's authorization.[54] Some at the US embassy in Santiago reached the same conclusion,[55] whereas others believed that his dismissal was for partisan reasons unrelated to the Antarctic.[56] The latter explanation suggests that Ibáñez might not have been opposed in principle to seeking retribution against the British, contrary to US pressure.

After the Antarctic dispute receded without further episode, Ibáñez won legislative approval to give US-owned copper companies new incentives in hope of increasing production as well as the government's tax revenues. The results were surprising and disappointing. The program adhered to the fiscally conservative recommendations of US economists. It was a model of the free market system except that it failed to increase the government's revenue while the companies nearly doubled their already substantial profits.[57]

In 1958 Chileans elected Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez as president in hope that his pledge to form a "businessman's government" would eventually benefit most households. The Department of State, which shared that hope, was relieved that anti-US sentiment appeared to be declining.[58] Washington increased its loans to augment the nation's resistance to communism and build confidence in the effectiveness of the democratic system.[59] The US embassy in Santiago commended Alessandri for including economists in the decision-making process and opposing to all forms of totalitarianism. It credited these factors with generating an unprecedented degree of goodwill in the history of US-Chilean relations.[60]

Nonetheless, personnel within the Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry questioned the wisdom of attending the Antarctic Conference of 1959 since the draft treaty upheld the letter but not the spirit of the nation's sovereign rights.[61] Moreover, many diplomats, politicians, and ordinary citizens questioned the United States' reliability. Though anti-Yankee sentiment had lost its mainstream appeal, the political extremes were again gaining strength.[62] Alessandri had narrowly defeated Salvador Allende who, like many Chileans, was willing to consider the Soviet Union's offer of aid with "no strings attached."[63]

CONCLUSION

Many nations were concerned that the United States sought to militarize the Antarctic and would interpret the term science however necessary to justify doing so. In fact US officials initially opposed the treaty's inclusion of a nuclear test ban, hoping to reserve the right to conduct tests under the guise of science, though they consented to the Southern Hemisphere nations' insistence, shared by the Soviet Union, that all types of explosions be prohibited.[64] While the United States would have preferred to make no distinction between its military and scientific objectives, it was denied that possibility.

Chile's skepticism toward the nature of US Antarctic "science" was especially pronounced given its frustration with the Cold War, Pan-Americanism, and its own relationship with the United States. On none of these levels did it exert as much influence as desired. It was unable to compete with the superpowers' massive defense expenditures or to guarantee its own security in case of a confrontation between them. Like all Latin American nations, it was unable to reduce the United States' intervention throughout the Western Hemisphere or to acquire the amount of financial assistance which it desired. Domestically it was unable to find any substitute for Yankee capital or to establish a more equal partnership with North America entrepreneurs.

As previously mentioned, the Chilean Escudero Plan provided the modus vivendi for the Antarctic Treaty, an accomplishment for which any nation would have been pleased to take credit, and which was all the more significant for Chile, given the many challenges which it faced. Though the Department of State recognized the plan's utility shortly after it was tabled, it did not formally adopt it until a decade later, by which time there was no viable alternative. Many explanations for this delay have been discussed elsewhere. In short Antarctica was not among the United States' highest priorities and it preferred to discuss its policy with Britain, the territorial claim of which extended over most of the Chilean Antarctic.

Broader explanations include the conflictive nature of US-Chilean relations dating back to the nineteenth century when the two nations viewed each other as rivals in the quest for dominance within the Western Hemisphere.[65] The United States soon went even further, establishing itself as the leader of the "free world," in which Chile was deemed far less important than any Western European nation. Despite the many characteristics which distinguished Chile from its neighbors, the United States often dealt with it as though it were a banana republic (see Figure 5).[66] Perhaps North American officials would have incorporated the Escudero Plan into an international proposal more quickly if it had been of European origin.

This article maintains that Chile does not warrant its traditional portrayal as having been a "nuisance" in the far south.[67] It is true that some officials made declarations which were not helpful in resolving the sovereignty dispute, but at the same time the Foreign Affairs Ministry had provided a means of leaving the dispute unresolved. Though many authors mention the Escudero Plan, they often understate its significance and refrain from providing broader contextualization. Indeed, from a certain perspective, the plan was but one of many factors which together culminated in the Antarctic Treaty. From another it indicated that Chile remained capable of influencing world affairs despite its relatively minor standing.

While this perspective can be supported without the use of cartoons, the featured images encapsulate the arrogance and condescension widely associated with US power, especially in relation to Latin America.[68] It is understandable that North Americans chose to focus on positive aspects of their nation's

leadership in the world, and to view the Antarctic Treaty as a tribute to its enlightened self-interest.[69] *The New York Times* published a cartoon which advanced the same notion, for it depicted Uncle Sam as a dove perched atop an iceberg with an olive branch in its beak, symbolizing the 1958 international proposal, surrounded by admiring penguins.[70] Chile does not appear to be represented, though it deserved to be, for its contribution had enabled the dove to succeed.

Figure 5: Uncle Sam warning a typical Chilean that financial assistance will be withheld unless he fully supports the US example. *Revista Topaze*, 16 May 1947.

FOOTNOTES

[1] For example, León Wöppke *et al.* (2005, 2006).
[2] Moore (2001: 734-37).
[3] Moore (2003: 81-82).
[4] See Muñoz and Portales (1991).
[5] *The New York Times*, 9 November 1946.
[6] *The New York Times*, 3 April 1955.
[7] See Department of State (1958b).
[8] The Escudero Plan was asssertive insofar as it both ensured the defeat of the 1948 U.S. internationalization proposal and provided the *modus vivendi* for the Antarctic Treaty, as elaborated in the conclusion.
[9] See Department of State (1976: 599-600; 1979: 1239).
[10] See Rabe (1988: 174-76).
[11] See Department of State (1959).
[12] Divine (1978: 1-5); Pringle and Spigelman (1981: 244-46).
[13] Whitfield (1991: 87).
[14] U.S. Information Service (1955).
[15] See Moore (2008).
[16] Graebner (1973: 121-22).
[17] Lapp (1955: 275, 308).
[18] See Brown (1988: 68-90).
[19] See Mackintosh (1945: 332-34); Stuart and Tigner (1975: 558-60).
[20] Dreier (1962: 29).
[21] Gilderhus (2000: 123-24).
[22] Rabe (1978: 285-87, 293-94). In the closing session, President Harry S. Truman declared that the United States would only be able to help Latin American nations which helped themselves, for its resources were not unlimited. Department of State (1972a: 78-79).
[23] Department of State (1972b: 39-40).
[24] Department of State (1972b: 42-43, 193-94).
[25] For a similar interpretation, see Dreier (1962: 31-32, 39).
[26] Rabe (1988: 54).
[27] Glauert and Langley (1972: 141-45).
[28] Stoetzer (1965: 17-18).
[29] See Trask (1977: 271-72); Benjamin (1987: 91-95).
[30] Sheinin (2000: 173).
[31] Council on Foreign Relations (1959: 362).
[32] Gilderhus (2000: 155-56); Camacho (1959: 29).
[33] Blasier (1976: 273).
[34] Bierck (1969: 31).
[35] *The New York Times*, 5 October 1954.
[36] See Department of State (1946).
[37] For example, *The New York Times*, 6 November 1946.
[38] U.S. Navy (1946, 1947).
[39] That is, the bacteriological and chemical warfare tests were successfully concealed. The search for uranium, though not officially verified, made international headlines.
[40] Department of State (1946).
[41] *The New York Times*, 24 October 1944.
[42] Department of State (1947).
[43] For example, *Time*, 1 March 1948.
[44] Department of State (1948).
[45] Connell-Smith (1966: 192).
[46] Aguilar (1968: 152-55).
[47] See Alexander (1978: 33-35). The US ambassador in Santiago at the time wrote that these actions made González Videla "more hated by communists than the head of any other nation in the world." Bowers (1958: 170). For conflicting interpretations regarding the extent to which US pressure accounted for González Videla's decision, see Erickson and Peppe (1976: 31); Barnard (1981: 360).
[48] Department of State (1983: 747-52).
[49] He often threatened to "seize control" of the companies, as he later did administratively. While action was less severe then nationalization, it nonetheless infuriated the United States. See Department of State (1969: 617-18).
[50] See Sater (2000: 121).
[51] Department of State (1952a); Department of State (1991: 693-97).
[52] Department of State (1952b).
[53] See Department of State (1954).
[54] Moore (2003: 74).
[55] Department of State (1953b).
[56] Department of State (1953a).
[57] Moran (1974: 104-11).
[58] Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to

Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, 13 February 1959, in Department of State (1991).

[59] President Dwight D. Eisenhower to Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez, [February 1959]; Department of State, Director of Office of West Coast Affairs to Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom), 18 November 1959, in Department of State (1991).

[60] US Ambassador in Chile to Department of State, 8 January 1960, in Department of State (1991).

[61] See Department of State (1958a).

[62] US Ambassador in Chile to Department of State, 8 January 1960, in Department of State (1991).

[63] Quoted in Operations Coordinating Board (1957).

[64] Moore (2008).

[65] See Sater (1990: 1-4).

[66] For González Videla's complaint to this effect, see Department of State (1969: 617-18).

[67] Debenham (1961: 234-35).

[68] Ambrose (1971: 183); Steel (1967: 184).

[69] Gaddis (1987: 59).

[70] *The New York Times*, 11 May 1958.

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